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1. A chronology of events
Period from 1 January 2001 to 2009
(a) Greece joined the eurozone (EZ) on 1 January
2001. It was the only of the 15 EU countries not to be
included in the introduction of the euro on 1 January
1999 due to its failure to meet convergence criteria.
3 EU member states, namely Britain, Sweden and
Denmark, had decided not to introduce the euro,
meaning that the EZ started with 11 countries. The
fact that Greece was allowed to join the EZ just two
years later, despite not having met any of the 5 con-
vergence criteria in 1998, shows that the criteria were
taken even less seriously in the case of Greece than
they were for those countries that joined the eurozone
in 1999. The widely expressed view that Greece should
never have been allowed to join in the first place cer-
tainly seems banal from today’s perspective. In prepa-
ration for monetary union Greece had reduced its
budget deficit from 14 percent to 3 percent between
1992 and 1999. At the time of its accession Greece’s
government debt ratio was lower than that of Belgium
or Italy respectively on their accession. After allowing
both of these countries to join in 1999, it was no
longer possible to refuse Greece membership on the
basis of these criteria. Politicians would have been
able to ascertain that Greece most certainly falsified
these figures had they wished to do so.
(b) Greece’s initial years in the eurozone were highly
successful: the country boasted the highest growth
rates in the eurozone after Ireland between 2000 and
2005. Its current account deficit as a percentage of
GDP dropped. The risk of both inflation and devalu-
ation seemed to disappear upon Greece’s accession to
monetary union, meaning that the significant drop in
the risk premium on debt instruments issued by the
Greek government did not seem unsubstantiated at
the time. The argument that the disappearance of risk
premiums on Greek securities between 2000 and 2005
constitutes early documentation of the no bail-out
clause’s lack of credibility is therefore not a com-
pelling one. Warning signals were certainly conspicu-
ous: the exceptionally high growth during the first
5 years of eurozone membership was fired by the
drastic drop in nominal interest rates on accession.
This process could not be halted. Despite the budget
relief ensuing from the fall in interest rates, the budget
deficit did not drop, but rose and the government debt
ratio along with it. The GDP share of current account
deficit almost doubled between 2004 and 2006, only
to increase substantially in the following year.
(c) The end of the honeymoon period came in two
waves. Firstly, the bankruptcy of Lehman in 2008
increased the awareness of capital market players that
not only large, internationally active investment banks
could go bankrupt, but that this could happen to
industrialised countries too. The newly-elected Greek
government of autumn 2009 then made the surprising
announcement in October that the budgetary figures
submitted to Brussels by the previous government
were completely unrealistic. The forecast budgetary
deficit for 2009 was not 3.7 percent as reported, but
12.5 percent. In the wake of this announcement
spreads between Greek and German government
bonds increased surprisingly slowly at first and subse-
quently at an increasing speed. Half a year later by
April 2010, after the rating agencies had downgraded
Greek government bonds to junk status, the spread
had reached 755 basis points. However, it became
increasingly clear that Greece would not be able to
refinance its government bonds due in 2010 at these
interest rates. State bankruptcy seemed inevitable.
Period from 1 February 2010 to 2011
(a) At the EU summit on 1–2 May 2010 the euro
countries decided to support Greece with bilateral,
pooled assistance loans. A 1–3 year agreement was
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together with the IMF, whereby the euro countries
would provide funds of 80 million euros and the IMF
would provide 30 million euros. The fiscal adjustment
plan that Greece committed to was supposed to guar-
antee Greece’s return to the capital markets in three
years. This agreement effectively annulled the no-bail-
out clause of the Maastricht Treaty, which, with the
active participation of the German government, con-
stituted the basis of Germany’s agreement to abolish
the DM and introduce the euro. The European
Central Bank subsequently announced that it would
henceforth accept Greek government bonds as collat-
eral regardless of their rating. In addition, it began to
purchase Greek government bonds in the secondary
market. The ECB thereby took over fiscal functions
for which it has no mandate. According to their coun-
try’s share in the bank's basic capital, this move gives
the taxpayers of euro countries a share in the losses
arising from the amortization of Greek government
bonds that have become worthless. Growing spreads
for Irish and Portuguese government bonds forced the
governments of the euro countries to take further
action. A week after the Greece package an agreement
was reached on a 750-billion-euro comprehensive res-
cue fund called the European Financial Stability
Fund (EFSF) for all of the other potentially threat-
ened euro countries. The EU contributed 500 billion
euros, while the IMF paid in 250 million euros. The
sum of 60 billion euros came from the EU budget and
the remaining sum of 440 billion euros was provided
by euro member states in the form of guarantees.
Ireland and Portugal are now receiving payments
from these funds.
(b) At the EU summit on 29 October 2011 politicians
reflected on the causes of the critical worsening of the
situation back in the spring, as well as on the conse-
quences of the bail-out package agreed upon at the
time. The German government had called for a sharp-
ening of the stability pact. To this end sanctions were
to be made automatic should the rules be broken and
violations were to be penalised with a loss of voting
rights. Furthermore, provision was made for private
creditors to participate in the financing of the bail-out
programs and changes to the Treaty were to be made
possible. The majority of these demands made by
Germany were unsuccessful due to opposition from
France and the ECB. Only a minor amendment to the
treaty was agreed upon. Article 104 b of the Maas  -
tricht Treaty was subsequently changed to enable
states to guarantee mutual assistance if the stability of
the eurozone were to be threatened without it. The
amendment was primarily motivated by domestic pol-
itics, but nevertheless served to safeguard the agree-
ments made in May against which cases were pending
in the German Federal Constitutional Court.
(c) At the EU summit of 24 March 2011 in Brussels
the expectation that assistance to Greece and the
bail-out fund would no longer be required after three
years was acknowledged to be erroneous. Follow-up
financing for the program of May 2010 due to expire
by the middle of 2013 was therefore agreed upon.
Instead of another program for a limited time peri-
od, however, a permanent bail-out fund was put for-
ward, namely the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM). It totals 700 billion euros, of which member
states pay in 80 billion euros and make 620 billion
euros available as guarantees. Hence the breach of
the stability pact’s no bail-out clause was not
reversed, but perpetuated. 
(d) At the EU summit of 21 July 2011 the question of
the participation of private creditors, which had been
previously requested but refused, was then raised.
With the banks as the biggest group of private credi-
tors, ‘voluntary’ debt relief for Greece totalling
21 percent of outstanding claims was agreed upon.
(e) The last euro crisis summit to date was held on
26 October 2011. Prior to the summit rising spreads
on Italian and Spanish government bonds led the
ECB to resume its purchase of these bonds, which
had ceased in the interim. The crisis now obviously
threatened to spread to the large Southern European
countries. Furthermore, Greece’s attempts at reform
were still progressing very slowly, forcing representa-
tives of the ‘troika’ of the IMF, ECB and EU, whose
positive vote was a condition for the payment of suc-
cessive tranches of credit, to abandon a visit to Greece
with no results. This resulted in a renewed need for
action. Two groups of decisions were taken to meet
this need. Firstly the bail-out package was enlarged.
This was implemented via an increase in the guaran-
tees provided by member states from 440 billion euros
previously to 780 billion euros. On the one hand,
Germany’s total liability via the fund thereby
increased from 146 billion euros to 211 billion euros;
and on the other hand the bail-out package was
enlarged via ‘leveraging’. In line with this leveraging,
the bail-out package can collateralise fresh lending to
euro countries by third-parties at a rate of 20 percent,
which represents a fivefold increase in resources in the
worst case. Secondly, an agreement was reached with
creditor banks on a second round of ‘voluntary’ debt
relief for Greek sovereigns. This debt relief no longerCESifo Forum 4/2011 39
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covers just 21 percent of the country’s debts, but now
accounts for 50 percent. For Greece this represents
total relief of around 100 billion euros. This relief
should shore up the sustainability of the debt burden
for Greece. According to the Troika’s forecasts, the
debt ratio should fall from 180 percent to just 120 per-
cent as a result. To safeguard the banks that are hold-
ing Greek bonds the latter should be capitalized.
Firstly, they should try to obtain the equity required
on the capital market. In cases where this is not possi-
ble, states should capitalise ‘their’ banks with budget
resources. If this is not possible either, the EFSF has
a fund of up to 30 billion euros at its disposal.
France's efforts to involve the ECB in the leveraging
and debt relief failed in the face of opposition from
Germany.
2. Greece’s external achilles’ heel
Political reactions to events in Greece can be criticised
– or praised – from many points of view. I will focus
on the country’s external trade imbalances. My mes-
sage is that I see no chance of addressing this imbal-
ance without an exchange rate adjustment and thus
without Greece temporarily leaving the eurozone. 
2.1 Data
After joining the monetary union Greece’s current
account developed as shown in Table 1. The first row
of this table shows the current account balance in bil-
lion euros and the row 2 demonstrates it as a share of
GDP, while the third row shows the real growth rate
of GDP. The table highlights a dramatic deterioration
in the current account between 2006 and 2008, both
absolutely and as a share of GDP based on an already
high deficit between 2001 and 2005. So the decline
began long before the financial crisis and cannot be
deemed to result from it. The slight reduction in the
deficit between 2009 and 2010 can be attributed to the
growth slump between 2009 and 2010. The sum of the
deficits over the entire decade of eurozone member-
ship totals 197 billion euros, which equals an 85 per-
cent share of GDP for 2010 (230 billion euros).
Almost the entire year’s social product would be
required to pay off the country’s net external debt run
up over 10 years. Just over half of Greece’s public
debt totalling around 350 billion euros (2010) is thus
held by foreigners and the remainder by Greeks.
Greece’s net external debt of 210 billion euros accord-
ing to the Bank of Greece at the end of 2010 is only a
little higher than this figure,1 meaning that today’s
external debt did effectively accumulate over the last
decade for the most part. 
2.2 Current account, capital account and Target 
balances
The figure of 197 billion euros is also of interest with
regard to the Target debate which Hans-Werner Sinn
initiated (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011). The
Target balances that national central banks have with
the ECB reflect the equivalent of changes in curren-
cy reserves in the previous par value system. The cen-
tral bank of a country with a balance of payments
surplus i.e. a surplus in the aggregated current
account plus capital account experienced an increase
in currency reserves, while the central bank of a
deficit country experienced a drop in currency
reserves. Sinn rightly points to the extremely prob-
lematic situation that, in the old system, a country
with dwindling currency reserves was forced to cor-
rect the situation or take loans in foreign currencies.
In the euro system the banks of a deficit country can
run up debts with their own country’s central bank,
which lowers the inclination to make any adjust-
ments. The government of a surplus country could
block the purchase of foreign currency by using the
flexibility of the exchange rate or appreciating the
value of its own currency and thus called the shots. In
the monetary union the surplus country does not
Table 1 
Development of Greece’s current account (CA), 2001–2010 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
CA in billion euros  – 10.5  – 10.2  – 11.2  – 10.7  – 14.7  – 23.7  – 32.6  – 34.7  – 25.8  – 22.9 
CA as % of GDP  7.2  6.5  6.6  5.8  7.5  11.3  14.3  14.7  11.0  10.4 
Real GDP growth 
rate  (%)  4.2 3.4 5.9 4.4 2.3 5.2 4.3 1.0  –  2.0  –  4.5 
Sources: http://Bank of Greece/Statistics/External Sector/Balance of Payments;  
http://OECD.StatExtracts/General Statistics/Key Short Term Indicators/ Current Account% of GDP; 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics/National Accounts/Real GDP Growth. 
1 See http://Bank of Greece, Statistics, External Sector, International
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Focus
determine whether to finance deficit countries; on the
contrary deficit countries decide to what extent the
central banks in surplus countries are to accept
claims on the central banks of deficit countries.
Article 107 of the Maastricht Treaty, which establish-
es the independence of ECB bodies from political
directives, is untenable in this respect. The Target sys-
tem provides the ESCB, and especially the ECB
Council, resources that are leading to the redistribu-
tion of income and wealth between the euro coun-
tries. Politicians, not the ECB, should take such deci-
sions. Moreover, the source of Target balances needs
to be examined very closely: given that a Target claim
can result from a current account surplus or a capital
account surplus, but net external claims can only
result from current account surpluses, current
account and capital balances must be drawn up sepa-
rately. 
If the size of the Greek central bank’s Target balance
is known, it is possible to deduce from the table above
how the Greek net external debt resulting from the
aggregation of current account deficits is distributed
between the Greek central bank on the one hand and
the rest of the Greeks on the other. The latter group
is often incorrectly referred to as the private sector.
However, this group refers to all nationals, private
and public, who must be compared with the central
bank. 
For Greece Mayer et al. (2011) cite a negative Target
balance totalling 87 billion euros of the end of 2010.
That means that Greece has financed around half of
its current account deficit (87/197), the ‘currency bal-
ance’ in other words, via its central bank and the ECB,
and the rest, or just over half of the total sum, at the
gates of the central bank or on the capital market via
the capital balance. By comparison: since the begin-
ning of monetary union Germany has accumulated a
total sum of 1,330 billion US dollars, which convert-
ed at the current rate of 1.40 US dollars per euro,
totals 950 billion euros. Its positive Target balance
recently amounted to 450 billion euros. In this case it
is also true that around half of the total net income
from trading was accumulated in the form of central
bank claims, while the other half represented the
increase in net income from trading by all other
nationals. 
2.3 Relief to date
(a) The measures taken to date to rescue Greece using
funds from the EU and IMF fund have mainly target-
ed the public sector. The funds served to enable the
repayment of maturing Greek sovereign bonds. The
banks were encouraged to write off an initial 21 per-
cent, followed by a further 29 percent of the bonds
that they held. Tax increases and spending cuts in the
public sector were demanded of Greece itself, to curb
the budget deficit and thus the pace of fresh public
borrowing. Excise duties were raised, public sector
wages were cut and public pension entitlements were
capped. All this primarily offers relief for the nation-
al budget; the current account is only indirectly and
insufficiently affected. A specifically external compo-
nent is missing from the programmes. What should
this look like?
To improve the current account, exports need to be
boosted and imports must be curbed. To this end, the
level of structure of aggregate demand in Greece
needs to be changed in the mid term. Curbing the
level of demand reduced domestic demand and
imports. A relative price reduction of domestic goods
changes the structure of demand and channels
demand towards Greek produce, which boosts
exports and shrinks imports. Curbing consumption
and investment, combined with enforced saving, is
part of the first concept, while improved competitive-
ness is part of the second concept. The corresponding
economic instruments are increases in taxation, pub-
lic expenditure cuts on the one hand and overall eco-
nomic real wage reductions on the other. In the long-
term improvements in supply-side conditions are
expedient: productivity increases through human and
physical capital enable decreases in unit labour costs
even without nominal wage caps, and product innova-
tion via direct foreign investment can open up new
export markets. Supply-side measures give rise to less
social resistance than the use of demand-side instru-
ments. Yet, they take a long time to bear fruits. In the
meantime the existing current account deficit has to
be financed via the external granting of credit. How  -
ever, as pressure to adapt falls, the chance of a fresh
start is being wasted, which is making lenders hesitate.
This is the true dilemma of the situation, which
requires the use of demand-side instruments with a
short-term impact. 
(b) It is widely recognized that the instruments used to
date are mostly limited to reducing the level of
demand and that any improvement in competitiveness
under such conditions is unthinkable. The public sec-
tor wage cuts decreed may have a beneficial effect in
terms of cost reductions, but the public sector does
not create any goods that are subject to internationalCESifo Forum 4/2011 41
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export and import substitution and competition.
Companies derive little benefit from these cost reduc-
tions. An overall economic wage cut imposed by the
state is not compatible with the freedom to set prices.
Pressure on wages arising from growing unemploy-
ment clashes with social welfare terms and is meeting
political opposition. So it is impossible to see where
the requisite improvement in Greece’s competitiveness
could come from. This qualitative argument gains
even more weight when quantitative factors are taken
into consideration. Sinn (2010) shows that, measured
by the GDP deflator, Greece lost 31 percent of its
com  petitiveness versus other euro countries between
1995 and 2009 and 48 percent versus Germany. These
dimensions show that wage moderation for a year or
two is not enough to restore competitiveness, but that
a zero-increase wage policy would be required for
decades, not years, to achieve this. Believing that this
could be possible is tantamount to indulging in polit-
ical illusion.
Demand is taking a downturn in Greece, as it did in
other countries in a comparable position in the past,
for political reasons and more thanks to a downturn
in investment than to one in consumption.
According to Eurostat figures,2 consumption by pri-
vate households as a share of GDP remained almost
constant from 2005 (75.5 percent) to 2010 (75.4 per-
cent), investments as a share of GDP, on the other
hand, fell from 20.0 percent to 14.7 percent in the
same period. Since today’s investments are tomor-
row’s growth, problems are clearly being postponed.
Ultimately, less hope can be placed a growth-based
solution to the debt problem in the case of Greece
than in that of other countries. Economic growth
may indeed decrease public sector debt because
growing income leads to higher tax revenues, which
reduce budget deficits. However, growing revenues
do not have the same beneficial effects on current
account deficits. The latter may become smaller with
rising income, but can also become larger. The effect
depends on the source of the growth. In the case of
export-driven growth, the current account will
improve, but in the case of internally stimulated
growth it will worsen.
In both cases rising national income entails growing
imports. In the first scenario export surpluses
decrease, while in the second scenario there are import
surpluses from the outset. Based on past experience,
the problems financing the current account deficit
arising in the second scenario paralyse growth in the
short and long-term. However, because Greece –
trapped in the monetary union – no longer disposes
the instruments to strengthen its price competitive-
ness, export-driven growth will not arise and current
account deficits will persist as a result. In short, there
is no chance of a sufficient improvement in Greece’s
competitiveness while it remains within the monetary
union.
3. The exit option
Leaving the monetary union would give Greece the
option of achieving economic recovery with rising
instead of shrinking employment. The mechanisms
are well-known and will therefore only be discussed
very briefly here.
3.1 The real balance effect
In the simplest case we model the economy with three
simple assumptions: (1) all of relative prices of the
goods observed in the model are constant, which is
referred to as a one-good world. (2) The country
under observation is small on a global scale, meaning
that the world market price of the goods produced
and consumed is constant. (3) The offer of goods is
constant. 
Initially the country shows a current account deficit:
it consumes more than it produces. Devaluation pro-
duces relief: at a given nominal money supply the real
money supply drops, because of the devaluation of
the local currency which raises the price of goods
measured in the local currency. Real demand drops
and at a given money supply excess demand and the
current account deficit drops. Constant production
presupposes that nominal wages comprehensively fol-
low the price increase owing to devaluation, so that
real wages remain constant. If the nominal wage were
to be fixed, the fall in demand would be compensated
for by a short-term expansion of supply with regard
to the targeted improvement in the current account.
This current account model manages without substi-
tution effects.
3.2 Substitution effects: tradeables and non-tradeables
Substitution effects complete the picture, if we are
looking at a two-good world. With tradeable goods
(tradeables T), and non-tradeable goods (non-trade-
2 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics/Consumption_expendi-
ture_of_households_2010 and http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/sta-
tistics/investment1_2010_(%_share_of_GDP).CESifo Forum 4/2011 42
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ables N), a devaluation induced price increase at a
given world market price leads to an increase in the
local price of tradeables. Demand shifts to the non-
tradeables sector, supply shifts to the tradeables sec-
tor. Both on the demand and on the supply side the
current account therefore improves.
3.3 Substitution effects, exportables and importables
Excluding non-tradeables, tradeables are split in the
model of section 3.1 into the exportable and im  -
portable goods types, and new substitution effects
take place, albeit of a different nature. If countries
specialise in the production of their respective
exportables, a devaluation of the local currency at
given wage levels and a given money supply should
lead to a shift in demand both on the part of nation-
als and foreigners to domestic goods, with the result
that production and employment usually increase as
the current account improves.
For a country already in debt in terms of foreign cur-
rency, high price elasticity of supply and demand may
not suffice to guarantee the normal reaction of the
central bank. The improvement in the trade and ser-
vices balance must be big enough owing to devalua-
tion to over-compensate for the worsening in the bal-
ance of income from earnings and investment.
3.4 The formalized form
The simplest Keynesian fixed-price variant of
model 3.3 arises from the definitional identity of the
open economy:
(1) Y = C + I + X-M and/or
(2) H = X-M
It is easy to derive that this means:
(3) H(Y, A) = X(w) – M(w, Y).
In the balance of the goods market stockpiling H, i.e.
the excess domestic supply, and net exports X-M, i.e.
excess demand from abroad, must be equal. Stock  -
piling depends on national income Y and auto  -
nomous expenditure A, while exports X depend on
the exchange rate w, and imports M depend on the
exchange rate as well as on national income Y. The
following applies for the partial derivatives: 
HY > O, HA = -1, Xw > 0, Mw < 0 and MY > 0.
With both exogenous variables A and w the reaction
of the endogenous variables Y and net exports is
affected by changes in data:
(4) (dY/dA) = (1/D) > 0 
(5) (dY/dw) = (Bw/D) > 0
(6) (d(X-M)/dA) = (-MY/D) < 0, 
where D = HY + MY > 0
(7) (d(X-M)/dw) = (BwHY/D) > 0, 
where Bw = Xw-Mw > 0.
It can be seen that the policy on the level of expendi-
ture, in a contractionary direction in this case in a pol-
icy of ‘cuts’, improves the current account (6), at the
expense, however, of downturns in production and
employment (4). Devaluation, or expenditure struc-
ture policy, on the other hand, directs economic
demand towards domestic products and leads to both
an improvement in the current account (7) and an
increase in production and employment (6). 
For this reason IMF packages for countries that are
experiencing balance of payments difficulties always
include depreciation recommendations. The South-
East Asian countries so quickly found their feet again
after the financial crisis 1997 for the same reason and
this is also precisely why such success will not happen
in Greece.
3.5 Stein’s contribution
A much more sophisticated model to explain financial
crises in general and more strongly geared towards
long-term effects, which can be applied to the euro-
zone and Greece is offered by Stein in this issue (Stein
2011). In a NATREX model (Stein 1990 and 2006)
with stock-flow-interactions he shows the roots of the
external debts of countries that are unsustainable in
the long-term. He proves that, in the cases of Greece,
Portugal and Italy, the public sector caused the crisis
with rising government spending; while in the case of
Spain and Ireland the private sector must be seen as
responsible for triggering the crisis with its soaring
expenditure on real-estate. Against this backdrop, he
believes that the constraints of the stability pact rules
on the public sector are in need of revision.
3.6 Objections
In the context of the demand for Greece to leave the
monetary union and a subsequent depreciation of itsCESifo Forum 4/2011 43
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currency, it is often argued that the wage increase which
usually follows a depreciation tends to make the latter
worthless. However, insofar as a real depreciation actu-
ally takes place, this could be equally as well achieved
within a monetary union with a nominal wage decrease
at a given price as via devaluation-based rising prices at
nominal wages outside the monetary union.
The first argument is to point to experiences in Italy,
which, by avoiding wage compensation following the
devaluation of 1992 generated the growth in produc-
tion and exports that finally enabled it to fulfil the
Maastricht criteria and secured its acceptance into the
monetary union of 1999. There is also the argument
that there is no improvement in the current account at
the same rate of increasing wages and prices, because
the real balance effect still has an impact at a given
money supply. 
The second argument is to say that a decrease in real
wages is more likely to succeed and at a significantly
faster pace with a devaluation than with nominal wage
adjustments. Devaluation increases the price of trade-
ables ‘overnight’ and reduces real wages immediately. A
real wage reduction, which can be mandated by politi-
cians, is certainly easier for the unions to accept than
having to go to their members with lower nominal wage
agreements following negotiations with employers.
Finally, the old argument of Keynes should also be
cited whereby it is not clear with wage negotiations in a
specific sector whether other sectors will follow with
lower nominal wage agreements, meaning that the sec-
tor-based wage reduction can be accompanied by a loss
in the macro-economic wage hierarchy. This risk is far
smaller with a devaluation-based reduction in real
wages. This argument weighs all the more heavily the
smaller and more open the economy in question is.
Ultimately, it is argued that devaluation is not a help-
ful instrument in the case of Greece, because the
country does not have sufficient opportunities to
diversify either on the export or import side, so that
price-induced shifts in demand are not to be expected.
This argument is not convincing. Greece has, for
example, a broad tourism sector with significant
opportunities for growth. In this sector, however,
Greece faces stiff competition from Turkey. As a non-
member of the monetary union, Turkey always has
the option of strengthening the competitiveness of its
industries, including tourism, by devaluing its curren-
cy. It is therefore not enough for Greece to win back
its competitiveness within the eurozone, it has to com-
pete with countries that can devalue – and which have
done so in the past and will do so again. The Turkish
Lira has devalued by around 30 percent against the
euro since October 2011. Against this backdrop, how
can Greece’s tourism sector hope to hold on to its
eurozone customers? 
4. Conclusion
Ken Rogoff, co-author of the book This Time Is
Different (Princeton, 2009) which features comments
on debt, banking and currency crises from eight cen-
turies, and who must be considered today’s top expert
in debt crises, has long-since recommended that
Greece take a ‘temporary time-out’ from the eurozone
(Rogoff 2011). Otmar Issing, who was a vehement
opponent of Greece leaving the eurozone for a long
time, is also arguing for Greece to take time-out as a
result of the debt relief that has been given, or the
change in the rules of play that give other debtor
countries false incentives (Issing 2011). It presumably
won’t help. The political will of the Euro countries to
keep Greece in the monetary union ‘cost what it may’
in the words of EU Com  mission President Barroso,
will not allow Greece to leave. Greece's interest in
leaving the eurozone is being undermined by fear that
the financial assistance provided by the euro countries
will disappear. The whole situation should it continue
will thus lead to growing foreign debt with subsequent
debt relief, in other words to a transfer union.
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